The Marine Corps in recent years has grappled with how to remain a “fight-tonight” force without enough ships to take Marines where they need to go – but a Navy effort to redesign its future fleet and an incoming administration dedicated to growing the Navy may bode well for solving this long-standing problem.
More than 70 years after the cruiser USS Indianapolis (CA-35) was sunk, a new clue discovered by a Navy researcher could give expeditions hunting for the missing ship a better location to look, the service said this week. Read More
Marines will have to continue to be adaptable to meet growing threats with limited resources by fundamentally rethinking how the Marine Corps organizes and operates, commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford said on Thursday. Read More
More than half of U.S. Air Force and Navy forces will be based in the Asia Pacific by 2020 as part of the Pentagon’s rebalance to the Pacific, Deputy Secretary of Defense Bob Work said during a Tuesday address at the Council of Foreign Relations in Washington, D.C. Read More
The following is a 1999 article from Proceedings, originally titled: The Sinking of the Indy & Responsibility of Command.
The July 30, 1945 sinking of the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis (CA-35) by the Imperial Japanese submarine 1-58 has been called the last, great naval tragedy of World War II. It is the stuff of legend: after delivering the atomic bombs to Tinian, the Indy was torpedoed, sinking in 12 minutes. At least 800 crew members survived the sinking and went into the water. On their rescue after five days, only 320 still were alive. Their stories have inspired three books, a movie, and perhaps yet another feature film. Read More
In a protracted discussion about how many aircraft carriers the United States needs, the top commander in the Pacific said the Navy already can’t meet the demands that Central and Pacific Commands are putting upon it with the 11 carriers now in the fleet. Read More
A new draft of Japan’s national security strategy calls for an expansion of the country’s military power in reaction to China’s military rise and growing territorial claims. Read More
Naval History Magazine, January 2013
After more than five exhausting years of global conflict, the British Commonwealth organized a powerful modern fleet that fought as equal partners with the U.S. Navy in the late stages of the Pacific war.
For the Royal Navy, the end seemed to come quickly in the Pacific war. Less than three days after the conflict’s outbreak, Japanese aircraft attacked and sank the most powerful British warships in Far Eastern waters, the modern battleship Prince of Wales and the battlecruiser Repulse . Their loss, followed within a couple of months by the capture of the naval bases in Hong Kong and Singapore, effectively drove the British navy out of the Pacific.
But the Royal Navy—in the form of the British Pacific Fleet (BPF)—returned to make a major contribution in 1945 to the defeat of Japan. The BPF, its vital bases, and logistical support organization did not exist until late 1944, but eight months later, the fleet had become the most powerful deployed force in the history of the Royal Navy.
The BPF did not begin to come into focus until the August 1943 Quadrant Conference of Allied leaders in Quebec. Agreement was reached that greater priority should be given to the Pacific war, while retaining the “Germany first” principle. But for much of 1944, Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff argued over how best to implement the decisions.