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A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0

The following is Chief of Naval Operations Adm. John Richardson’s new long-range guidance for the U.S. Navy: A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority 2.0.

From the Document

The United States Navy will be ready to conduct prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. Our Navy will protect America from attack, promote American prosperity, and preserve America’s strategic influence. U.S. naval operations—from the seafloor to space, from the blue water to the littorals, and in the information domain—will deter aggression and enable resolution of crises on terms acceptable to the United States and our allies and partners. If deterrence fails, the Navy will conduct decisive combat operations to defeat any enemy.

Why Design 2.0? What’s Changed?

A Design for Maintaining Maritime Superiority, Version 1.0, released in January 2016 (Design 1.0), was explicitly intended to be assessed and, if necessary, revised to stay relevant.

This update reflects the first reevaluation. There were three reasons we undertook this assessment. The first reason was to ensure our plans were aligned with updated strategic guidance. President Trump issued a new National Security Strategy (NSS) in December 2017, and Secretary of Defense Mattis issued a supporting National Defense Strategy (NDS) in January 2018. A new National Military Strategy (NMS) will follow. These documents orient national security objectives more firmly toward great power competition. While Design 1.0 highlighted that competition, these new strategies demand that we reevaluate our current heading to ensure it maximizes the Navy’s contribution to the objectives they set forth. The second factor driving our assessment was to account for progress that has been made since Design 1.0 was issued. We have accomplished many of the tasks it articulated, and have advanced many more—it’s now time to define what comes next.
The third motivation was to validate Design 1.0’s characterization of the strategic environment, to check our assumptions.”

Design 2.0 reflects the results of this assessment. Overall, the structure of Design 1.0 proved sound: the characterization of the security environment, the Core Attributes, and the Lines of Effort (LOEs) remain valid and relevant. Readers should recognize the new version as a continuation of Design 1.0; a major course change was not required.

There are, however, some adjustments. Design 2.0 provides updated operational guidance to link strategy with execution. The “Achieve High Velocity Learning” Green LOE has been tightened, focusing on outcomes rather than processes. The tasks supporting all of the LOEs have been updated to establish new and ambitious goals that will spur us to accelerate our progress. This is an all-hands effort. Like Design 1.0, Design 2.0 establishes the framework to guide our behaviors and investments this year and in the years to come. More specific details about programs and funding adjustments will be reflected in our annual budget documents.

Download the document here.

  • joe

    get ready for the fireworks. the way that i read this, USA is going back on the offensive… quick, fast & in a hurry. china and russia has been pushing us around pretty good and i would say starting about the New Year, we are going to be hearing about some serious conflicts.

    • Ed L

      I think it would be better if the Navy decided on the next FFG contact be awarded in the Spring of 2019 and not in 2020. 16 months for contact submission? what is that a Glock in your profile picture? I perfer the sig P-320 full size

      • Curtis Conway

        Amen, and it better be a good one.

  • Curtis Conway

    All the reassessment in the world will do the Navy no good if relevant
    and commensurate expertise in the Strategy & Tactics, Engineering & Marine Sciences and Navigation are not maintained, and rock solid from the base up in the Jr. Officer Corps. Leadership is not natural, and must be learned through correct instruction, example & experience.

  • Leatherstocking

    First, thanks to Sam for FINALLY giving us a pdf to the source document. Second, the pieces I see do not support this. Columbia is 18-24 months late at this point. Logistics have been underfunded for two decades, suppliers are gone and it takes more than drawings to build, test and qualify replacement equipment. There’s no money for commissioned ship upgrades as those ships are extended 10-15 years. There are not enough yards or supply chain to support a single low-to-medium conflict with a blue-water adversary. Navy cyber is 25 years behind the Air Force and Army systems (and they are not that good either). Hope is not a strategy but was a great comedian. If the CNO actually believes this plan, then the lower echelons continue the Navy legacy of sucking it up and not presenting an accurate picture. For additional information and how history repeats itself, see the US Navy, 1935-1941.

  • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

    RE: LOE Green 2. Removing responsibility for concept and capability development from the Pentagon and putting it into academic/Fleet centric hubs is a great idea.

    We’ve seen endless penny-wise, pound-foolish decisions emerge from OPNAV since early 2000s. LCS, early sundown of S-3, shutting down SWOS, etc. All might’ve looked good on paper – but outcomes were less than ideal.