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U.S. Surface Warfare Officers Will Now Use Logbooks to Record Time at Sea

Photo of a sample page of the new Mariners Skills logbook for US Navy surface warfare officers. US Navy Photo

Surface warfare officers are borrowing a lesson from naval aviators and will now keep a logbook of their time underway throughout their career, according to a new Navy instruction obtained by USNI News.

Now, when new ensigns report to the Basic Division Officer Course they will now be issued a “Surface Warfare Mariner Skills Logbook” in which they will record everything from bridge time to underway replenishments and ultimately create a database for surface forces to analyze in the development of future training. The logbooks will also be distributed to all SWOs already in the fleet.

“Both unqualified and qualified [surface warfare officers] will be issued a hard copy Mariner Skills Logbook,” read the instruction. “They are personally responsible to use and maintain the logbook throughout their careers and begin tracking their experiences upon receipt of the logbooks and this instruction at their commands.”

The logbooks will not only serve the individual sailor but also feed into a larger database to inform future training.

“Documenting bridge time, simulator time, and special evolutions is necessary to tailor future training and ensure that an officer has been provided the at-sea opportunity necessary to develop mariner skills proficiency,” reads the instruction from commander of U.S. Naval Surface Forces Vice Adm. Richard Brown and U.S. Naval Surface Force Atlantic commander Rear Adm. Jesse Wilson.
“Over time, the logbook will allow the surface warfare community to conduct the trend and data analysis necessary to link experience with proficiency. The logbook is an initial step toward that goal and will provide a tool to aid the SWO community in addressing the challenges of building and maintaining necessary levels of performance and readiness.”

The logbook recommendation is one of more than a 100 of surface warfare fixes that were identified in the aftermath of the fatal collisions of USS John S. McCain (DDG-56) and USS Fitzgerald (DDG-62) in 2017 that killed 17 sailors total.

A transferable record of skills and experience is a key component of U.S. naval aviation and allied forces like the U.K. Royal Navy.

U.S. surface warfare, by comparison, was lax in recording skills following initial certification, found two reviews into the surface navy after the McCain and Fitzgerald collisions.

Mariners Skills Logbook

“Vice Adm. Brown has made it clear that our top priority is to produce the most experienced and capable commanding officers as possible,” SURFOR spokesman Cmdr. Patrick Evans told USNI News. “We do this by increasing experience at sea in ships, documenting that experience in the logbook, and using that information to tailor future training and track progress and experience of those officers throughout their careers.”

The logbook requirement, which was included in the recently passed Fiscal Year 2019 National Defense Authorization Act, joins other implemented Navy initiatives meant to improve basic mariner skills the service has found lacking in the wake of the 2017 reviews .

In June, the service announced a retooled surface officer career path that put an emphasis on mariner skills, after an evaluation found major gaps in the qualifications of certified officers of the deck. Also this summer, the Navy began putting money behind the recommendations to refresh surface forces training. The $64 million was included in the service’s Fiscal Year 2018 reprogramming request that includes money for new maritime training schoolhouses on the East and West coasts, money for Automatic Identification System laptops, development money for a next-generation surface search radar and the money to reestablish U.S. 2nd Fleet in Norfolk, Va.

Additional changes to the surface warfare officer path and training are expected to be included in the release as part of the Navy’s of the Fiscal Year 2020 budget early next year.

  • NavySubNuke

    As in a physical paper log book? In 2018?
    What will really be interesting is if anything ever comes of these. Is this just going to be something that officers keep in the bottom of the closet in their stateroom and update once in a blue moon right before an inspection or are they going to be submitting summaries of these things to promotion and selection boards?
    If they are going to be submitted to promotion and selection boards how are those boards going to reconcile people who were trapped on a ship in long term overhaul vs. someone who was forward deployed to Rota or Japan? Or are we going to just start punishing those unfortunate enough to accomplish necessary maintenance on their ships by refusing to promote them for going where they were ordered to go and not getting enough sea time as a result?

    • BudgetGeek

      Indeed. How hard would it be to automate the reconciliation of a ship’s bridge log with the individual SWO “mariner skill logbook”? Law firms, accounting firms, consultants, and medical firms all have software to track how those professionals spend their time to support billing practices. Some break time down into 10 or 6 minute increments. The greatest navy in the world should be able to adapt one of those programs pretty easily. And a certification by the senior watch officer would add a level of veracity to the reported figures. If it is not in a centralized system, how is Big Navy going to use it for analysis, promotion, and administrative board proceedings?

    • Todd

      Indeed, the Aviator’s log book is a sacred book, this version will only work if it’s treated the same.
      Yes, I would hope that maintenance/drydock time is counted (after all, LCS officers will never fill out anything in this log eh?)

      • Lazarus

        Unlike other ships, LCS crews must fully train/qualify for all watches/equipment/etc before relieving an off-going crew. LCS training is very good and getting better.

        • WhiskyTangoFoxtrot

          “Man the Ready-latte-launcher, and prepare a full broadside of coffee beans at that enemy frigate…”

          • vetww2

            You forgot cocktail breaks.

          • Todd

            Oh that’s right. That’s why each LCS has TWO full crews, because all of that time on shore, putting in 9-3:30’s, going home every night and sleeping in your own bed, seeing the wife and kids everyday, barbeque-ing on the weekends, and some “training(?) is quite tiresome…L O L

        • vetww2

          For what? The only thing I heard that was a half decent mission was minesweeping.

        • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

          Plenty of time to train when you don’t deploy for an entire year!

        • Rocco

          Off topic

      • NavySubNuke

        So do aviators have to submit their log book (or excerpts of it) as part of selection or promotion boards to prove they have met some sort of hours requirements?

        • Rocco

          In regards to making landings & launches the LSO does that.

      • Leroy

        lol! Yeah, it’s sacred alright, but only so you can keep track of your flight hours for the airlines! : )

    • IssacBabel

      It is not a paper log book, it is a fiber based non-volatile storage system
      with significant anti-tamper functionality.
      Aka NFBSS, translates to New F??? BS support.

      • vetww2

        Concise, Coherent, Consistent and Correct.

    • vetww2

      Two careful stidies recomend PAPER ballots (not punched cards) to eliminate errors or meddling in elections. Computer wonks GO HOME!!!!
      Simply trying to look up-to-date does not confirm that you ARE. There are many advantages to being on-line, but security is NOT one of them. A LAN is reasonably secure, if their is no possible connection to a WAN. Using the CLOUD is a security disaster.

    • Rocco

      Agreed!! It’s just a glorified diary if you ask me!! If a situation was going on what log book is going to be referenced by the next relief . I don’t agree with digital as that can be deleted or changed.

  • Lazarus

    What a 20th century concept; a physical book. It looks like something just waiting to get lost. I would photograph every page of the book with signatures on the chance that the book could get lost in a move, fall overboard, get damaged by grease/oil, etc. It would have been much easier to have officers going off watch swipe a CAC card and record their watch activities via a computer program. Senior Watch Officer, XO and CO review appropriately (daily at sea/weekly/as needed.) Why burden people (and afloat units) with more books?

    • Uncle Mike

      Laz, in theory I agree with you. But in practice, I think it’s more important to (re)establish a culture of accountability first, and using time-proven methods and tools (like a logbook) is just fine with me. The cultural change must start immediately. The more modern (and expensive) tools can follow. For the SWO community to regain a reputation for competence (if not excellence) the culture must change, and it must change quickly.

      • Lazarus

        Agree on the culture aspect but wish they would have come up with a more LT friendly way of doing it.

    • Duane

      A logbook may be 20th century, but a tangible paper record is still required for most legal documentation in life. It can be damaged, but a smart person will scan the paper record and retain an electronic archive copy.

      That’s what aviators do. They are required to maintain a hard copy logbook but can do logging real time electronically for later recording in a paper book. Consider that to be a transitional technique.

      • Lazarus

        Again, just looking to keep it easy. Aviators don’t have to manage their plane’s maintenance as SWO’s do their ships.

        • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

          Sigh. No Laz. Not true at all.

          Every operational aviation squadron has an O-level maintenance department. And it’s typically the largest department in the squadron.

          • USNVO

            How many pilots are assigned to the maintenance department?

            How many pilots are responsible for the maintenance on their aircraft to include depot level maintenance?

            How many pilots are responsible for the personnel who maintain their aircraft?

          • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

            In my squadron – about 1/2 the aviators served as branch or division officers in maintenance. They were/are responsible for the enlisted personnel who maintain their aircraft.

            Depots are usually commanded and staffed by engineering duty officers, but I believe that’s true of the surface community as well.

          • Lazarus

            All the SWO’s on a ship except the XO and CO have direct equipment maintenance responsibility and ownership of the sailors involved.

          • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

            I guess your point is that SWOs are busy? No disagreement.

            But how much of that work actually needs to be accomplished by a SWO? And how much is admin stuff that can/should be delegated or dumped in the circular file?

            If logbooks help the Navy understand the proficiency levels and shortfall of it’s SWOs, then they should be implemented now. Even in paper form. Worry about the “100% electronic” solution later.

          • Lazarus

            It’s not that simple. Driving a ship is a team effort where mistakes by any one individual (officer or enlisted) can lead to disaster. 150% agree that SWO training at all levels has seen reductions in quality and quantity over the last 25 years and these trends must be reversed. It would be great to “round file”a lot of the paperwork SWO’s do at sea and SURFPAC needs to do that. So far though they have just doubled down on assessments.

          • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

            Aviation is also a team effort. A lot of the work goes on behind the scenes, but is no less critical. There are at least two names etched on the side of every naval aircraft: the pilot and the plane captain. The latter usually an airman or third-class.

            As for fixing problems: it starts with setting priorities and standards. I firmly believe a NATOPS like program is needed to make safety and proficiency part of SWO culture. Otherwise it gets lost in all the other less important stuff.

            Aviators can and do lose their wings if they flunk an annual NATOPS check. It doesn’t look good for the Safety/NATOPS officer or the CO either. There is no such system of individual or unit-level accountability in the surface community.

          • Lazarus

            The person on a ship who equivalently “looses their wings” is the CO. Like the pilot, that person is fully responsible for the operation of their platform. Unlike the plane though there are dozens/hundreds/thousands of people doing (or not doing) things that contribute to that performance. Each of those folks are accountable at some level for their part of the ship’s operation, but only the CO (like the pilot) has responsibility for everything. The CO cannot say the engineering dept screwed him/her because they did poor maintenance. A pilot seems to be innocent in a similar case but not the ship CO. Different cultures at work.
            I fully agree some kind of NATOPS like organizing principle for the surface navy is a good idea. Some blend of good seamanship, warfighting ability and taking care of people. Many surface documents say those things already, but need to somehow be combined into one ethos.

          • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

            I think you’re confusing individual and group accountability. I don’t believe a SWO typically loses his ‘water-wings’ when there’s an accident or mishap in which they weren’t personally involved. An aviation CO won’t lose his wings unless for same reasons. If relieved they usually get reassigned to a staff somewhere.

            Operating a ship is obviously a group effort. NATOPS also stresses crew resource management (CRM) as a task. Regardless: there is a need to assess how well a person does their tasks individually and as part of a larger team.

            My immediate concerns are with the basic skills and proficiency of the individuals actually conning the vessel. A recent spot-check by SURFOR found “significant concerns” in the core skills and knowledge of 137 of 164 junior SWOs that were tested (83%).

            That is distressing, but what is more startling is that there there isn’t a process to assess the basic skills of the guys and girls driving warships. The TYCOM had to direct a spot-check after two major mishaps to find out that the force (or at least a representative sample thereof) lacks core skills! That’s a a problem.

            Also: how does one recognize and get rid of non-performers? There is no Field Evaluation Naval Aviation Board (FENAB) like process to get rid of the SWOs who make it through commissioning and training but simply can’t hack it in the Fleet.

            A NATOPS like system of continual evaluation could help address both of these issues. It’ll keep folks on their game are weed out those who just cannot do the job.

          • Lazarus

            But it is not every pilot has a maintenance responsibility as do surface officers.

        • vetww2

          The primary log should be for the aircraft. just as the SHIP’s LOG was.

      • vetww2

        I coulc not agree with you more.

    • tom dolan

      Laz: You would naturally assume that a lieutenant or (God help us)a lieutenant commander on a surface officer track had at sometime in their career served significant time as a OOD or junior OOD wouldn’t you? Not so. We”ve all served at one point or another with Lieutenant Paper Clip who knows the book front to back but has never done the job or led anything other then four desks and a water cooler. A physical log is easier to fill out accurately then fake and good officers will look to fill them out with challenging technically useful skills.

      • Lazarus

        Agree there are folks out there with little service at sea. Officers today have extensive admin burdens already and it would be good to make the logging requirement easy.

    • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

      Laz. Logbooks are a much better concept than what the surface community was doing previously to track bridge time. Which was absolutely nothing.

      Aviators still maintain manual flight log books. They are a lot less prone to glitches or hacking.

      • Lazarus

        SWO’s are already overwhelmed by the amount of admin work they must conduct at sea and this addition without a corresponding reduction elsewhere will not be well received by the fleet. The other point surface navy leadership seems to be fighting is that the bulk of the individual training ought to be done before an officer reaches there ship. Some of that training also must be done on an actual ship and not in a simulator. Much of the shipboard record keeping of training has already moved to electronic vice book means. One’s medical record offer’s an example for what modern training should look like.

        • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

          See my comment re: NATOPS.

  • vetww2

    Boy, am I behind the times. I thought a handwritten log was the only way to determine authenticity, When did the method change. It is too easy to change or phoney or “Correct” an electronic log. It defeats the purpose. I bought, at auction, an authentic log by Admiral Dewey, when he wqs a CDR. Priceless, in both intrinsic and emotional values. It is just like you were there, with him. Incidentally,

    Two careful stidies recomend PAPER ballots (not punched cards) to eliminate errors or meddling. Computer wonks GO HOME!!!!

  • jetcal1

    Beware the “big pencil” a 10th here, a 10th there.

  • Dave Homan

    I cannot believe this. They can’t conn a ship but now they are expected to write a log? How long before they wind up having to dump lube oil on it so it won’t change, just like the bell sheets and smooth log. Will they continue to use crayons too?

    • Shane Graham

      They are too busy eating said crayons.
      So – no.

  • tom dolan

    OK….what was currently being done with Surface Fleet officers was clearly not working and this system of physically logging service time WAS demonstratively an effective tool for aviation officers. Too many watch standing officers were standing watches without the experience or the knowledge to do so safely. Running ships into each other and killing sailors is rather inconvenient also…get over it and log your actual experience so a CO knows you’ve done the job before and your not simply some career staff officer looking for a little salty time to fill out your resume.

  • Pete Novick

    I echo the sentiments below.

    You mean we don’t start with a touch panel screen with data that goes straight to the cloud?

    The surface navy has tried many things since 1975, but SWO retention rates move only in a narrow band.

  • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

    It just seems like there is something culturally wrong with SWOs. Why are they so slow to recognize and fix problems?

    Aviators have maintained logbooks since at least the 1920s to track qualifications and proficiency. Why did it take 100 years for SWOs to adopt?

    The aviation community has also long recognized that proper sleep and adhernce to the circadian cycle is critical to performance. Plenty of science to back it up too. Yet SWO leadership is only now (maybe?) thinking about crew-rest.

    It’s amazing that it takes multiple accidents for the surface community to recognize a problem – and only then do things that others are already doing!

    • USNVO

      You mean as opposed to the, literally, thousands of aircraft crashes before the FRS concept and NATOPS was implemented?

      Or the submarine community losing a nuclear submarine before implementing SUBSAFE.

      The Surface community, which is admittedly is much smaller, has had a relative handful of accidents in the last 50 years or so, hardly an epidemic. If you take all the deaths from accidents in the surface community over the last 50 years it is still less than the number of pilots lost the year before NATOPS was implemented.

      As a result, the imperative to change anything has not been as strong as in the aviation community.

      • the_artist_formerly_known_as_m

        Yes, the frequency of surface ship accidents is much smaller than that of aviation. The Navy also has 3,700 operational aircraft and less than 300 ships. It can transfer replacement aircraft and train new pilots a lot faster than it can build or repair warships. The aviation system-of-systems is designed to absorb peacetime ‘wastage’ and wartime losses. (That’s why they are called Fleet Replacement Squadrons.)

        The surface force is not set up that way. There’s no slack. Any losses are extremely expensive and time-consuming to replace. The recent spate of accidents in C7F rendered two very expensive, hard-to-replace guided missile destroyers combat ineffective. FTZ will be in repairs for two years. JSM is unknown but it’s already been a year.

        So let’s be very clear: Naval Safety Center stats may show the rate of Class A surface mishaps is small, but the consequences of such mishaps are not.

        Logic dictates when you are dealing with infrequently occurring but high consequence events, taking a reactive approach as you proposed is the exact wrong answer. You need to be proactive: understand the risks and then take steps to reduce, eliminate or mitigate them.

        I do not see this happening in the Surface Force. It seems like SWO leadership views safe and effective operations of warships as a secondary concern instead of their raison d’être. There was a recent article from a UK Royal Navy officer which seemed to indicate this view is held by our allies as well. USN SWOs are simply not thought of as good seamen.

        I have recommended in other forums the need to bring in a Flag/SES from outside the Surface Community to do a top-to-bottom audit on the Surface Forces culture of safety. My thoughts would be Chief of Naval Reactors or perhaps even the head of the National Transportation Safety Board.

      • Duane

        Sorry, ship handling is inherently safer than aviating, in every conceivable way. You are comparing the safety record of apples vs. oranges

        Ships can lose power and nobody dies. In aircraft, losing power means you either make an emergency landing, or you attempt to parachute to a safe landing, either of which is extremely risky … there’s no floating about in air waiting for a tow to show up.

        Ships travel at speeds of up to several tens of knots, with little chance of kinetic energy doing in the crew, while aircraft travel at hundreds to thousands of knots, where there is tremendous risk of KE (both vertically and horizontally) doing its crew in.

        Comparing the safety record of surface ships directly to the safety record of aircraft is like comparing the safety record of chess to that of tackle football.

        • USNVO

          Thanks for proving my point, you might want to reread what I said and why, it doesn’t say what you think it says.

  • airider

    Not sure why they need to keep individual log books.

    Ships Bridge, Engineering, and CIC logs list who is on watch, for how long, and the details of the evolutions, orders, navigation situation,etc. The only thing I see individual logs good for is to keep sailors memoirs. Since SWOs don’t sail their ships alone (unlike aviators), and since there are sailors directly responsible for keeping the logs on ships, I don’t see the value of individual logs.

    What I’d do is put this on the respective departments to enter the ships log information into a common database that the Senior Watch Officer, XO, and CO can review to see who’s doing what and how often to support qualifications, and proficiency. The data can then be uploaded ashore so the TYCOM’s can assess trends and look to head off problems before they become problems.

    Ideally this would be done on a per ship basis, since no two ships or their crews are alike. Using this information, the Training Groups can move forward with more focused training where the crews need it, and have the time to do it for all watch sections.

    Time to get in front of the problem, instead of continue the tail-chase this individual log book boondoggle will continue.

  • Ed L

    I remember those working toward there SWO pin would keep a record of the number watches they stood and what positions they held during those watches in there SWO PQS handbook

    • Uncle Mike

      Ed, I think this is supposed to help solve the problem of tracking experience and skills development *after* qualification. Prior to SWO Qual, I agree with you that the PQS is a decent record.

      In fact, I’d like to see the new log entries counter-signed by the senior watchstander or supervisor, just like PQS line items. There needs to be accountability at that level too. With a systemic problem like this, it’s not enough to know how many hours of bridge watch were stood. We also need to know who trained and signed off. They may need re-Qual too. And I’m willing to be there are plenty of SWO department heads who would fall into that category. This problem is not limited to 0-3s and below.

  • RisingSunSailor

    While I don’t specifically have a problem with a log book (though I agree with Laz that it should be digital), my issue lies with the fact there a no metrics tied to it. Aviators can point to their log books and state “I’m short XX number of hours and need to get my deck hits in” whereas the SWOS have no such requirement to point to. As such, it’s a record for records sake vice something that’s actually useful. Additionally, what does it mean for folks that are mid-career and standing other watches like TAO? Are you going to make DH’s and PA’s stand OOD in addition to their regular watch in order to meet hour requirements?
    As presented, this new initiative leaves a lot to be desired.

    • Lazarus

      Agree that succes/failure metrics should be included but that will be difficult beyond very basic requirements. Not every ship may do enough pier landings, unreps, hours of flight quarters or plane Guard to allow for officers to meet whatever the standards are. Also, how many bridge hours or evolutions are “enough?”

      • RisingSunSailor

        That’s the multi-million dollar question now, isn’t it? Coupled with that, aviators can point to the fact that each “rep” they get is tied to their skill, and their skill alone (more or less). SWOs, on the other hand, are guiding a team. For an OOD, each set/rep can be different based on who’s conning, who’s at the helm, is the CO on or off the bridge and what’s their background, etc.. Driving a ship is a team sport, not an individual one.
        Does that mean I don’t think we should track metrics? Absolutely not. But until “Big Navy” can quantify what hours mean in relation to mishap reduction, it will remain a metric that is simply collected. Saying that, IF (and this is a stretch), we can come up with SOME kind of metric, then perhaps those pier landing, UNREPS, FQ hours, etc. can be pushed to ensure all SWOs get enough reps/sets in. Kind of like a ship doing hours of CQ’s on end, if the requirement is there, it can be pushed, justified, and a budget (hours and money) allocated. Without said requirement, it’s another unfunded requirement.

        • Duane

          You are drawing a distinction without a dufference. So what if one is leading a team or going solo? It makes no difference.

          The log records an officer’s experience as a OOD, including metrics (number of hours, and calendar recency), and qualitative data (what evolutions performed, weather, traffic, type of ship, daytime vs. night, whether other traffic was encountered, and if so, how much density or volume).

          These are amalogous to the kinds of log entries made by aircraft pilots, both military and civilians, for the purpose of judging the expertise and experience of pilots in a wide variety of decisions made concerning the subject pilot … ranging from judging currency, competence, promotion, insurance rates, and pay (if a professional pilot).

          • RisingSunSailor

            I’d put forward that leading a team is a very different dynamic than going solo. Throughout my career, I observe on a number of occasions a “weak” OOD get paired with a strong team to compensate for their lack of ability/knowledge. Should their hours be weighted the same as someone who has a weak team? In a tie breaker, who wins?
            I get what you’re saying in that it shouldn’t matter, but rather I’m pointing out that there’s more to the metric than simply hours or reps and sets.

      • Sean Peters

        My guess is that this effort represents phase I of this effort: they’re going to use data gathered from the log books to establish how much is enough. Once that’s been established, a potential phase II is to use the data to establish standards.

    • James B.

      You raise great questions, which the logging of SWO watchstanding metrics will move the Navy toward answering. Without logbooks, SWOs didn’t know what they didn’t know.

      • Duane

        Exactly. Every effort involved in quality management starts with collecting and analyzing data from current operations. Without data, existing quality cannot begin to be defined, let alone improved.

    • Sean Peters

      The “what about TAO hours” was my first question as well.

  • James B.

    The paper logbook is simply a representation that the Navy is actually tracking individual SWOs on watchstanding hours and experience, rather than doing so on a unit basis or not at all.

    Naval aviators keep their paper logbooks as analogue backups and souvenirs, but everything is also logged electronically. The point is not the recording medium, but that detailed logs of individual performance are being maintained.

    The next step is to use this base of recorded knowledge to establish and refine standards of training and currency for SWOs, which are still generally absent.

    • tim

      Record keeping must be digital only. Everyone must look at the same data to make sure that records are correct. Metrics must be established and optimized along the way. If you want a print out, hit the print button please. I have seen to often systems that record wrong and only the person that is being recorded would know there is a mistake! Force everyone to maintain one digital version please 🙂 otherwise – I think this is a great step forward!

      • James B.

        I take it the Navy has never lost any of your digital-only records, then?

        If you can’t afford to lose it, always keep a backup copy.

  • Dwimby

    So painfully overdue…

  • arebel1

    I didn’t see them keeping track of any CIC Watch Officer / TAO time/skills.

  • Masau80

    Entries in aviator logbooks are not made by the aviators. These are more like personal journals – and would seem to be ripe for gun-decking, over-embellishment, or simply laziness. I would think that the better solution would be to have the OOD, or XO (watch dependent) make the entries. What it is doing, is just adding another administrative layer to the very full days that underway SWOs already have. Pity the poor young officer with crummy penmanship.

  • Patrick Stafford Golden

    That’ll fix it…more paperwork

  • M Yates

    The Admirals meant to say, “all SWOs except LDOs.”

  • Donald Carey

    All the folks below advocating hand written logs haven’t seen the average teenager’s “handwriting” – it is harder to read than Egyptian hieroglyphs (or some doctor’s prescriptions – I’m a retired Pharmacist), plus they are painfully slow when forced to use something other than a keyboard or smart phone. It will have to be electronic.

  • Shane Graham

    So does this mean that in the event of an ‘incident’ (or catastrophe) THESE logbooks would be gathered and immediately put into a locked safe until the official investigation happens as well?

    Nothing is worse than a gundecked log post incident.