Home » Documents » Document: New Navy Instructions on ‘Near-Miss’ Reports in Surface Fleet

Document: New Navy Instructions on ‘Near-Miss’ Reports in Surface Fleet

The following is the Sept. 18, 2017 commander, Naval Surface Force, U.S. Pacific Fleet (COMNAVSURPAC) instruction 3040.1: Significant Event/Near-Miss Reporting.

  • D. Jones

    A near-miss is a hit. Unintended close approach makes sense.

    Fire these paper-pushers. They’re “fixing” all the wrong problems.

    • D. Jones

      As an aside, buzzwords are being replaced by buzzphrases taken from the Harvard Business Review (“instill a culture of continuous improvement” 7/2013, “culture of critical self-assessment”, “culture of non-specific gender self-actualization”) and elsewhere. Just precisely how does one “instill a culture of continuous improvement”? Carrots? Sticks? Does this imply that the Navy has a “culture of continuous regression” or “culture of temporal stasis”? Is it too much to ask for simple direction like, “double the watch in congested areas” and “absolutely no distracting devices” and “any tomfoolery i.e. cavorting of a racy nature gets an immediate keel-hauling”? No. Consultants will be hired to help “instill a culture of kaizan six-sigma human asset rationalization” or whatever some NoVa outfit can sell. Harrumph.

      It’s bad enough people in the private sector get battered with meaningless catch-phrases, used frequently by management whose only interest is hitting quarterly numbers and bailing before another company collapses, but must we embrace this even more in the military?

      Maybe the Navy can hire E. Hunter Harrison away from CSX to implement “Precision Scheduled Sailing”, blaming the sailors, other ships, taxpayers and enemy forces when things go wrong. That will boost morale.

      Honestly, wordy gobbledygook and yet more forms is compounding the problem. If everyone is filling out forms and watching even more PowerPoints, who will be left on watch?

      • publius_maximus_III

        DJ: The USN needs to be empowered to leverage its synergies into a Win-Win solution. That, plus looking out for other ships headed their way.

  • Ed L

    I thought getting All Sailors properly Trained was the GOAL not doing paper work.
    This is were the policy you better get promoted or get out needs to be done away with. Nothing wrong with a LCDR or LT that is a extremely excellence ship handler, or Helicopter pilot be for forced out because they can not get promoted. Maybe they can’t get premoted because they are not that good at paper work, brown nosing or a little over weight. Same with Enlisted a well trained 2nd or 3rd Class can be of great benefit to a ship. When I enter the navy it was routine to see a Seaman who was an excellence Boat Coxswain and or Helmsman to have 2 hash marks on their sleeve.

    • lugnutmstr

      The British Army has 20 year Privates!

  • homey

    Doesn’t the Friday funnies already cover this…?

  • Ed L

    Up or out must go. Maybe these accidents would have not happen if the OOD would have had 10 or more years of sea duty

  • Mike Mulligan

    Another one of my request in this came to fruition from a earlier comment. You might as well call it now the Mike Mulligan Navy 🙂

  • Western

    You can have the crew man the rail, and each sailor wave the first two pages of the report at the approaching ship.
    Mr. McClane, go explain this memo to Secretary Mattis. Bring a spare uniform.

  • Duane

    Collecting data on near misses is a useful exercise. This seems to take it to extreme, though. It’s obvious the Navy let the systems analysts run wild, and it will either be ignored or cause further reduction in readiness as a counterproductive and ridiculous waste of time that ought to be devoted to training our ships’ officers and sailors to operate competently.

  • publius_maximus_III

    I can see where having up-to-date standardized “near miss” statistics would have helped forewarn of deadly incidents like the Fitzgerald and McCain collisions. For example, suppose the number of near misses suddenly spiked, might be time to impose special preventative measures across the fleet in question — increased number of lookouts, reduced watch durations, restricted operation in certain areas or at certain times — until the next set of statistics justified a return to normal operations.

  • dave lacey

    D. Jones nailed it!
    Those who can just do. Those who have done can then teach, guide, lead, motivate and inspire by example.
    The paper pushing horde of MBa wannabes infect, like a fungus, organizational management structure everywhere as guide-ons for self justifying pension seeking bureaucrats. Just barnacles on the ship of state.

  • DHodge

    Why does this only apply to PACFLT Surface Forces? Why is this a COS signed instruction? I see this as occupying the majority of a CO/XO time during TYCOM indoc (if that still exists). Is this requirement in addition to the 3 or 4 other reports that must be filed?
    Having a frank discussion about what just went wrong or almost went wrong is useful, but adding an additional report is not. This does not help fix the problems of insufficient sleep, overworked ships/crews and ship material condition.

    • John Locke

      Maybe because SURFLANT hasn’t signed off on a similar instruction yet???

  • John Locke

    More paper. This is what you get when you bring in civilian corporations to “fix” military issues.

  • Gundog15

    The “I’m telling!” instruction. What a load of crap.

  • homey

    This’ll be used just as much as the command breathalyzer’s that went out to all commands…

  • homey

    This’ll be use about as much as the command breathalyzer’s…