• b2

    Gee, about time…. More “stuff” (capacity) at last (IE- platforms)

    Priority should be:

    1-Ford class acquisitions, make EMALS.ARG work or go away-

    1a- aircraft for these air wings- Buy more SuperHornets now- EFG- and look at advanced SH. Bring back OT testing for F-35C before we commit to that platform. Most importantly actually field the MQ-25 whatever that platform looks like (new/old) before 2020. That mission is killing any Hornet/Lightening proposed airwing….Long term look at going back to purpose built aircraft- Fighter, Attack and S-3 like vehicles…

    2- Buy more Arleigh Burkes…

    3- Buy more VA class attack boats…

    4- Pick an OTS Frigate: weaponize, and field it quickly

    5- recap AEGIS- now

    6- can the LCS or cap it- now

    7- Recruit for and professionalize the US Navy for today and for the future. IE- go back in time and build the “right navy” just like Reagan did….There are lessons learned about that time just ripe for picking… Train and professionalize the millenials, don’t just accommodate their proclivities…How we did things in the past is not our enemy all the time….
    8- Lastly but most importantly “recap and sustain” what we do have concurrently. Do the upkeep on the fleet. Beware of RCM unless it is prototyped without spin…Plan for overhauls. Do the D-level maintenance on the existing aircraft and increase the flying hours for our aviators- that alone will save lives and increaser readiness.
    A start…maybe. A plan as good as any. We know we will probably have to deviate enroute but we may reach our destination.

  • Lazarus

    A “White paper” is not a strategy. Who knows if a 355 ship fleet is actually up to the global task of securing sea control when and where the US desires. This seems more an effort to build a strategy around an arbitrary number rather than the needed, bottom up assessment of US global requirements needed to determine an appropriate naval strategy, and the right force structure with which to carry out its tenets. Also, “White papers” have little or no connection to the Navy’s Program Objective Memorandum (POM); the only document that Congress really understands or cares about much.

    • Wayne Russell

      Well Lazarus you seem like a reasonable guy to argue and discuss these topics. Some of you quick points are right on the mark; some others I expect need some strong argument. Good luck. At least you are on the best Facebook page for credibility and documentation.

      • Lazarus

        Thanks. Agree some points need a greater reference base on my part.

  • airider

    Selfsuficiency is the key reason the Navy has been successful in the past.

    The expanding reliance on outside support undermines this to the point it’s become an accepted answer for training, maintenance, and operations. We used to have sailors who could fix and operate anything aboard. We’ve short changed the sailors to the point now where most issues become regular tech assists for all sorts of issues. We need to teach, train, mentor, and then design better…..I’ll take our all volunteer, and if were smart, better trained force over any other on the planet.

  • The Plague

    Well, the Navy is already being run like a business : blah, blah, Connectivity, blah, blah, Agile, blah, blah, Thinking, blah, blah, Complacency, blah, blah, blah…

  • yoda55

    Enumerating what needs are does not address the risks of getting there. Although increasing speed of acquisition is “good”, it may not be possible when other limiting actions/instructions are imposed. We work within a framework that has boundaries. Faster gets it there, but if that increases risk by 50% – is that really what we want to hand the folks who must be the “pointy end of the spear”?