The following is the Sept. 27, 2016 Congressional Research Service report: U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues. Read More
The following is the March 10, 2016 Congressional Research Service report, U.S. Strategic Nuclear Forces: Background, Developments, and Issues. Read More
The U.S. Air Force and Navy are working to include more commonality in their next batch of nuclear tipped ballistic missiles, the head of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM) told reporters on Thursday. Read More
The top U.S. military commander in South Korea suggested that Pyongyang has the technological capacity to build miniaturized nuclear warhead that could fit on an intercontinental ballistic missile. The Pentagon press secretary Rear Adm. John Kirby said that Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel broadly shared the officer’s concerns. Read More
The following is the Dec. 19, 2013 report from the Congressional Budget Office: Projected Costs of
U.S. Nuclear Forces, 2014 to 2023.
In its most recent review of U.S. nuclear policy, the Administration resolved to maintain all three types of systems that can deliver nuclear weapons over long ranges—submarines that launch ballistic missiles (SSBNs), land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and long-range bombers—known collectively as the strategic nuclear triad.
The following is a Sept. 26 letter sent from the Senate ICBM coalition to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. Read More
When the U.S. Navy’s new SSBN (X) conducts its first patrol in 2031 it will be an entirely new vessel, but the boat will initially rely on life-extended 1990s vintage Trident II D5 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) to perform its nuclear deterrence mission. The Navy currently expects to keep the D5 in service into the 2040s, after which it may replace the long-serving weapon with a new missile. Read More
The Yuri Dolgoruky, Russia’s newest ballistic-missile submarine, officially entered service in the Northern Fleet on 17 January, completing a long and arduous journey into Russia’s navy. While the submarine is often lumped in with Russia’s aggressive new armaments program, construction actually started back in 1996, when Vladimir Putin was not the Kremlin’s overlord but an obscure bureaucrat serving as deputy chief of the Presidential Property Management Department, and Russia was not an oil-fueled “energy superpower” but a bankrupt economic disaster. A great deal has happened to Russia’s navy since construction of the Dolgoruky began, very little of it good. So while the submarine’s newness has been highly touted—by, among others, a Russian government intent on promoting “modernization”—when viewed in context it’s not nearly so impressive.