The following is the March 10, 2025, Congressional Research Service In Focus report, Ukrainian Military Performance and Outlook.
From the report
Since Russia launched its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) have been increasingly challenged to defend against Russian advances, given ongoing disadvantages in personnel and a less developed defense industry. The UAF has demonstrated flexibility over the course of the conflict, as well as an ability to integrate Western security assistance into its operations. Nevertheless, the UAF continues to face obstacles to sustaining momentum against Russian forces, including personnel and equipment losses.
The Biden Administration supported Ukraine’s defense of its territorial integrity against Russia’s invasion, and since early 2022, Congress has enacted five supplemental appropriations measures to provide assistance to Ukraine. In March 2025, the Trump Administration announced a pause and review of further security assistance and intelligence sharing to Ukraine, which if sustained would likely affect the UAF’s ability to sustain combat operations. The UAF’s evolving condition and performance may be of interest to the 119th Congress as Members weigh the impact of U.S. support for the UAF and consider any potential further assistance.
Personnel
The UAF’s overall performance to date has been bolstered, in part, by high levels of recruitment and motivation. High personnel losses and desertion, however, pose continued challenges to the UAF’s ability to sustain effective operations.
After Russia’s initial invasion of Ukraine in 2014, the UAF gained important combat experience fighting Russian-led forces in Ukraine’s eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk (known as the Donbas). In 2022, Ukraine was able to quickly mobilize these veterans and other volunteers into new volunteer Territorial Defense Forces (TDF) and the Reserve forces without the need for lengthy training. This likely contributed to UAF effectiveness since Ukraine did not have a fully developed professional noncommissioned officer (NCO) corps.
Since the beginning of the 2022 war, the UAF has suffered high levels of casualties, lowering force quality. In order to replace these losses, the UAF needs new recruits to regenerate forces. The UAF’s need for immediate reinforcements creates pressure to deploy troops with only basic training. However, the UAF also needs to train personnel to conduct complex operations and employ advanced weaponry in order to sustain combat operations. UAF officials say they have the capacity and capability to conduct new recruit training inside Ukraine.
Currently, the UAF also is experiencing recruitment challenges. Reportedly, the average Ukrainian soldier is around 40 years old, and some recruits often have health or substance abuse issues. Some reports indicate that recruitment officials also are resorting to more coercive methods. Ukraine passed legislation in April 2024 to address some recruitment issues (including allowing some prisoners to serve in exchange for a reduced sentence) but continues to reject calls to lower the conscription age from 25 to 18 because of public opposition to lowering the age.
In February 2025, the UAF implemented a new option for volunteers between the ages of 18 and 24 to sign one-year contracts in return for higher wages, a signing bonus, exemption from mobilization for 12 months, and other social benefits. UAF officials have reported a high level of initial sign-ups in response.
Additionally, the UAF reportedly struggles to train officers for staff positions to assist commanders in managing and coordinating operations. The lack of trained staff officers has in some cases led to higher-level command staff coordinating and managing tactical operations, leading to centralized and slower decisionmaking. The UAF has announced organizational changes (such as organizing multiple brigades under the command of a corps) to improve management and coordination of its forces.
In February 2025, the UAF suspended the creation of new brigades made up of new recruits to focus on reinforcing existing brigades. The UAF took this decision in response to criticism from Ukrainian officials about the new brigades’ poor performance (including desertions and the opening of criminal investigations).
Equipment
The UAF operates a mix of Western and Soviet-era or Russian equipment. This variety of systems complicates maintenance and standardization. To date, the UAF has sustained significant equipment losses, apparently leaving some UAF units without mechanized or motorized vehicle support. The UAF has exhibited resilience in the face of such losses, in part due to Western security assistance and concerted UAF maintenance efforts.
Ukraine has nearly exhausted its supplies of Soviet and Russian artillery and rocket ammunition, making the UAF almost entirely reliant on Western assistance for artillery systems and ammunition. To date, the UAF has demonstrated an ability to use the qualitative advantages provided by Western security assistance (e.g., long-range precision fires) to mitigate Russian quantitative advantages in artillery.
According to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky, Ukraine produces 40% of the equipment and weapons it needs, and the United States supplies 30%. Ukraine’s domestic defense industry has increased production but remains unable to meet the country’s full wartime demands. International partners are seeking to help Ukraine strengthen its defense industry capacity (including through joint production agreements with Western defense companies), thus reducing its reliance on Western security assistance.
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