
The Arctic is “where the confrontation of the world’s leading states is unfolding,” the head of the Russian Navy said at a recent forum in St. Petersburg where regional cooperation had traditionally dominated the agenda.
“In addition to political and economic measures to contain Russia in the Arctic, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region,” said Adm. Aleksandr Moiseev, who took command of the Russian Navy in March. He specifically mentioned the United States’ re-establishing the Second Fleet in 2018 and the 2021 creation of NATO’s Joint Force Command in Norfolk.
Moissev said one reason for the rise in tensions has been Moscow’s suspension from the eight-member Arctic Council, following the invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, and the placing of economic sanctions on Russian financial institutions, businesses and individuals.
The other seven nations in the forum are NATO members.
He added that updated Arctic strategies, including the United States, “enshrine an anti-Russian focus and also allow for the thesis that the nationalization of the Northern Sea Route by the Russian Federation is inadmissible. Also, unfriendly states are increasing their military presence in the region.”
Moissev, who previously commanded Russia’s Northern and Black Sea Fleets, did not mention in his remarks the Kremlin’s military build-up in the Arctic over the last two decades. The most recent report from the Center for European Policy Analysis entitled “Up North” detailed many of those initiatives and offered recommendations on what NATO could do in this changed security and climate environment.
Left unchecked, Russia “wants to claim the Arctic as theirs,” Adm. Daryle Caudle, Fleet Forces commander, said during a recent online Navy League event. He and Moiseev were reflecting on the new dynamics in the region. Examples include Canada which has re-evaluated its High North Strategy and foreign policy, China has shown increasing economic and military interest in the region and new Scandinavian allies reminding NATO look north to a major threat to the alliance’s security.
Caudle, speaking as the component commander for Northern Command, said, “my goal is for the Navy to have a footprint there” with the capabilities to operate in a region where navigation systems are under stress and communications difficult.
He added, “we have a team up there” to contain Russian’s Arctic ambitions. He was referring to allies like the United Kingdom, Norway, Sweden and Finland. He specifically mentioned the Harry S. Truman carrier strike group conducting joint operations with Royal Navy carrier strike groups in October in the North Sea as an example of regional allied cooperation
“We want to do things on the surface,” not just with submarines in the Arctic and northern waters. Caudle added, “I’m all behind” the recently signed memorandum of understanding between the United States, Canada and Finland to build icebreakers. Called ICE Pact, “what I would like to see is them delivered” to demonstrate year-round presence.
The United States Coast Guard in its first posture statement, released this year, called for eight U.S. icebreakers. The service in its 2023 force mix analysis identified the need for eight or nine, Lt. Krystal Wolfe, a Coast Guard spokesman said. Four years ago, Congress authorized six with some funding for three. The United States has two operational icebreakers now.

The Coast Guard confirmed that a third icebreaker, refitted in a Tampa, Fla., shipyard to U.S. standards before commissioning, will be named Coast Guard Cutter Storis (WAGB 21). It will be the second cutter to bear that name, Wolfe wrote in an email to the Juneau Empire newspaper. The cutter likely will be homeported in Juneau, Alaska when work is completed in several years. It was originally commissioned as the commercial ship Aiviq in 2012.
Regional security experts, like those at the Center for European Policy Analysis, noted the Kremlin’s military build-up in the Arctic goes back almost to the start of the 21st century as Russia saw economic growth from exploiting the minerals and energy sources in the Arctic.
As a result, the Kremlin has heavily concentrated its Northern Fleet’s second-strike ballistic missile submarines and strategic bomber forces around the Kola Peninsula in the European Arctic and the Kamchatka Peninsula with in its Pacific Fleet. It has also modernized airfields and ports, often with Chinese investment, along the Northern Sea Route and inside the Arctic Zone of the Russian Federation for trade and military use.
The center in its most recent report on Arctic security described the build-up along the sea route and Arctic Zone as an update of the Soviet’s “Bastion” strategy.
“Bastion is a multi-domain, multilayered ‘protective dome’ of air defense, sea denial, coastal defense systems, and domain awareness capabilities located along critical choke points of the [Russian Arctic Zone]. It aims to heavily deny adversary military operations and degrade the operating environment at sea, in the air, and in the electromagnetic spectrum.”
At the Navy League event, Caudle said Beijing’s continuing need for minerals, natural gas and oil to sustain its manufacturing sector explains China’s immediate Arctic economic goals with Russia. “They want their fair share” of those resources.
CEPA’s “Up North” report, as others have noted, added the Chinese have “dual-purpose” reasons for an Arctic presence militarily. “(S)uspicions arise that scientific research presence feeds intelligence and domain awareness — not least to bridge China’s learning curve in cold weather operations. China is also managing a fleet of polar-specific satellites [and] plans to deploy a large-scale network of dual-use listening devices in the Arctic Ocean as part of the Underwater Great Wall,” the report said.
On the military and constabulary side, Caudle added the Chinese and Russian navies have conducted joint operations and Beijing’s Coast Guard and Moscow’s Border Guard have also patrolled together in northern waters.
This was the first time the China Coast Guard was reported operating that far north.

Canada, with the second most national territory in the Arctic, has updated its defense strategy and foreign policy aims to meet today’s realities. As both documents spell out there is expanding military presence, accelerated economic development, and a fast- changing climate’s impact on the region, including longer shipping seasons.
In announcing the new foreign policy approach, Canadian Foreign Minister Melanie Joly said, “we are in a tough world, and we need to be tough in our response. Competition is growing across the globe, and the Arctic is not immune. Many countries, including non-Arctic states, aspire for a greater role in Arctic affairs. The evolving security and political realities in the region mean we need a new approach to advance our national interests and to ensure a stable, prosperous and secure Arctic, especially for the Northerners and the Indigenous Peoples who call Arctic home.”
Canadian officials stressed how the foreign policy paper complements the defense strategy for the Arctic, “Our North, Strong and Free.”
Shortly after the release of the defense strategy this spring, the Royal Canadian Navy solicited shipbuilders with Requests for Information on costs and details to modernize its submarine fleet. The contracts when let could call for the building of 12 ice-capable submarines.
Ottawa currently has four Victoria-class boats in its fleet
An aggressive Kremlin in Europe starting with Georgia and Moldova and expanding to Ukraine first in 2014 with the seizure of Crimea and all-out invasion in 2022 caused two traditionally neutral Scandinavian nations to reassess their security.
“War is close to us [and] in worst case scenario, it can spread to our region,” the Finnish foreign minister who negotiated its admission to the alliance said. Pekka Haavisto added at a recent Wilson Center discussion Finland has led the way in calling for greater defense spending than the 2 percent of gross domestic product target to modernize European nations’ forces. He also wanted to break down the barriers for the movement of troops and equipment in a crisis should Russia attack a NATO member.