The People’s Liberation Army Navy is “gradually expanding its operational reach beyond East Asia into a sustained ability to operate at increasingly longer ranges, including a continuous presence in the Gulf of Aden,” the Pentagon reported in its latest assessment of Beijing’s military power.
Ely Rattner, assistant secretary for Indo-Pacific security affairs, said the report released this week recognizes that China has “both the will and capability to alter the international order in its favor.”
China’s announced military budget is $220 billion, but actual spending is running 40 to 90 percent higher, he said at the event at CSIS. Last year, the report estimated Beijing was spending between 30 and 40 percent more than what it publicly released.
While possessing the world’s largest navy, personnel quality especially in the officer corps for all service remains a challenge, Michael Chase, deputy assistant secretary for China, Taiwan and Mongolia, said at the Center for Strategic and International Studies’ event Wednesday.
Rattner said Xi Jinping’s goal of having his military ready to carry out a “short, sharp invasion” of Taiwan by 2027 “is not possible right now.”
“Despite its rapid progress, the force has not yet demonstrated the type and scale of sophisticated urban warfare or long-distance logistic capabilities that would likely be required for operations against Taiwan or major contingencies overseas,” the report stated.
The report also highlighted lingering issues with the Chinese officer corps, known as the “five incapables” by Chinese media. Those include“critiques officers who cannot judge situations, understand higher authorities’ intentions, make operational decisions, deploy troops, or deal with unexpected situations.”
Chase called these deficiencies “long-standing shortcomings,” reads the report. Chinese media blamed the “peace disease” for these continuing problems.
The report said the Chinese have introduced more realistic training exercises that also call for officers to operate in a joint environment” to correct the situation.
In terms of the maritime, “today the PLAN is largely composed of modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and anti-submarine weapons and sensors,” reads the report.
“This modernization aligns with the PRC’s growing emphasis on the maritime domain and increasing demands for the PLAN to operate at greater distances from mainland China.”
Longer-range, precision strike from submarines and surface combatants on land targets remain priorities for military planners.
China and Russia also expanded joint operations in 2023 that have continued into this year. Rattner said these air and sea exercises “have rattled cages in Japan and Kora. But they should not be seen as building “advanced operational capability, but viewed as “coordinated” exercises.
Chase said the Pentagon expects China’s nuclear arsenal to grow to 1,000 warheads by 2030. The report puts the number now at 600.
“What are all these nuclear weapons for,” Rattner asked during the CSIS session. In attempting to talk with the Chinese about nuclear arms, he added, “they haven’t answered the question.” Beijing’s “refusal to discuss” stance includes cyber and space military efforts.
At the same time as the number of warheads has grown, the Chinese diversified how they are delivered. Beijing now has a functional nuclear triad with a modernized strategic bomber force and six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines. The warheads themselves run from low-yield nuclear explosions to weapons with much more devastating impact.
Chase added what this adds up to is the Chinese have “more rungs on the escalation ladder in terms of how they could conduct nuclear operations.”
In the background of modernization and build-up is the impact of Xi’s anti-corruption drive. The first targets purged two years ago on graft charges came from the senior ranks of the Rocket Force and its missile development program. Until the investigations took hold, Chase said the Rocket Force “was the most trusted of the services.”
The most recently named official is Adm. Miao Hua, who directed the public work department of the Central Military Commission since 2017.
Similarly, two officials who held the title of defense minister have disappeared from public view.
Rattner said the purge could continue for some time. The impact on lower-ranking military officials and their civilian counterparts could make them more “risk adverse” to engaging in activities that could lead to more investigations.
Earlier this week, a Pentagon official, speaking on the condition of anonymity, said, “Xi Jinping appears to have made the anti-corruption campaign not only in the PLA, but in the party more broadly, really a hallmark of his tenure as the top leaders. …I think they’ve identified it as something that really poses great risks to the political reliability and ultimately the operational capability of the PLA.”
