Philippine President Marcos passed two maritime laws last week in a move that Manila says will strengthen its sovereignty over waters within the country’s archipelago and the South China Sea.
Using standards set forth by the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), the Philippine Maritime Zones Act and Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act identify the country’s internal waters, archipelagic waters, territorial sea, contiguous zone, exclusive economic zone, continental shelf and sea lanes. Manila wants these acts to solidify its rights and sovereignty within the Philippines’ maritime zones.
“With these pieces of legislation, we align our domestic laws with international law, specifically the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea or UNCLOS, improve our capacity for governance and reinforce our maritime policies for economic development and for national security,” Marcos said during the signing ceremony.
Following the seizure of Scarborough Shoal in 2012 by Chinese forces, Manila turned to international courts to delegitimize Beijing’s claims in the region, culminating in the 2013 arbitration case and the 2016 South China Sea Arbitration. Despite the outcome of the arbitration, which discredited Beijing’s nine-dash-line claim over the majority of the region via UNCLOS, the Philippines had yet to adopt the international laws to delineate its waters. Through these laws, the National Maritime Council noted that the Philippines can “respond to regional maritime disputes with a clear, unified voice.” Loren Legarda, a senator who worked on both laws, also highlighted that they provide a “robust legal foundation for the Philippines to assert its jurisdiction and sovereign rights over its vast marine resources and surrounding seas.”
While the Philippine Maritime Zones Act clarifies Philippine waters both internally and into the exclusive economic zone, the Philippine Archipelagic Sea Lanes Act targets a long-standing issue that the country has faced with foreign vessels transiting its waters. Composed of an archipelago of 7,641 islands, the country is frequently used by Chinese forces transiting between the first and second island chains without informing the Philippines beforehand.
In 2022, Philippine Navy frigate BRP Antonio Luna (FF-151) tracked a People’s Liberation Army Navy surveillance ship transiting the Sulu Sea, which at the time was the training area for a bilateral U.S.-Philippine military exercise. Manila protested the transit, claiming that the vessel was not practicing innocent passage. Since then, more substantial Chinese maritime movement has occurred in the country’s southern waters around Basilan and Tawi-Tawi, including the transit of multiple People’s Liberation Army Navy surface action groups and even a carrier strike group. A preliminary map released by the National Mapping and Resource Information Authority identified routes to be used by foreign vessels and aircraft within the Sulu Sea and Luzon Strait.
China condemned the new laws, claiming that they destabilize the region and reiterated its claims by posting a list of coordinates detailing maritime features, including Sabina and Second Thomas Shoals, and their Chinese names.
“This is an important element in what must be a comprehensive national strategy for the Philippines to combat what has grown to become a maritime occupation of the West Philippine Sea by a hostile imperial power,” Ray Powell, director of the SeaLight Project at Stanford University’s Gordian Knot Center for National Security Innovation, told USNI News regarding the new laws.
Powell highlighted how the Philippines is the only country bordering the South China Sea to have foreign military bases, noting the air and naval base at Mischief Reef, and restricted access to maritime features within its exclusive economic zone. “This includes Scarborough, Second Thomas and Sabina Shoals, access to all of which are now actively and often aggressively controlled by Beijing,” he said.
To counter what he describes as an “occupation force,” Powell stressed that the Philippines “will need to adopt a strategy of resistance, of which lawfare is one necessary element.” Manila’s current strategy has consisted of publicizing incidents and monitoring Chinese forces. “Imperialists don’t simply pack up and leave because they are in the wrong. Rather, they withdraw when the accumulated costs of occupation over time outweigh the perceived benefits.”
