Report to Congress on Iran and U.S. Policy

September 10, 2024 9:25 AM

The following is the Sept. 8, 2024, Congressional Research Service report, Iran: Background and U.S. Policy.

From the report

Relations between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the United States have been largely antagonistic since the Iranian Revolution of 1979, with tensions spiking since 2023. Of particular concern for U.S. policymakers in 2024 are Iran’s regional activities and those of its partners, including the October 2023 Hamas-led attack on Israel; ongoing attacks against U.S. forces and additional targets in the region by other Iran-backed groups such as the Houthis; and increasingly open direct military conflict between Iran and Israel. The Iranian government’s human rights violations, its nuclear program, and its deepening ties with Russia and China also pose challenges for the United States. Congress has played a major role in shaping U.S. policy toward Iran, including by authorizing extensive U.S. sanctions, seeking to influence diplomatic engagement with Iran, and funding support to U.S. partners facing Iranian threats. Selected issues of potential congressional engagement or interest include:

Iran’s Foreign Policy and Support for Terrorist Groups. Iran’s government seeks, among other goals, to erode U.S. influence in the Middle East while projecting power in neighboring states by backing a range of regional armed groups, including Hamas, Lebanese Hezbollah, and other U.S.-designated terrorist organizations. Since the outbreak of war in Gaza, Iran-backed groups throughout the Middle East (which sometimes refer to themselves as the “axis of resistance”) have conducted attacks against U.S. forces in Iraq and Syria and international shipping in the Red Sea, drawing retaliatory U.S. military action. Observers debate the nature of Tehran’s relationships with and influence over these groups.

While neither the United States nor Iran appears to seek a direct military confrontation, the evolving threat perceptions, political calculations, and strategic goals of multiple actors in a dynamic combat environment could increase the risk of such a conflict. The July 2024 killing (attributed to but not publicly claimed by Israel) in Tehran of Hamas political leader Ismail Haniyeh marked an escalation of tensions and Iranian leaders have vowed to avenge his death. Such a response could take the form of a direct Iranian missile and/or drone strike against Israel, such as Iran launched in April 2024, or could take a number of other forms, perhaps months or even years in the future. The United States has moved additional military assets such as fighter jets and an additional aircraft carrier strike group into the region to deter an Iranian response.

Iran’s New President. In May 2024 President Ebrahim Raisi, a hardliner elected in 2021 and potential successor to Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, died in a helicopter accident, leading to an early presidential election in summer 2024. While a reformist candidate, Masoud Pezeshkian, defeated several more conservative figures, low turnout may signal continued public discontent with the Iranian government. President Pezeshkian’s ability to overcome the structural realities of Iran’s political system, including the Supreme Leader’s ultimate control of decisionmaking, appears limited. The large-scale popular protests broke out after the September 2022 death of Mahsa Amini, who was arrested for allegedly violating Iran’s mandatory hijab (or head covering) law and died in custody, appear to have subsided but the grievances underlying them remain unresolved amid continued government repression.

Iran’s Nuclear Program. U.S. policymakers have for decades signaled concern about Iran’s nuclear program. The 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) imposed restraints on Iran’s nuclear activities in exchange for relief from most U.S. and international sanctions; the Trump Administration ceased U.S. participation in the JCPOA, reimposing U.S. sanctions, and Biden Administration attempts to revive the JCPOA stalled in fall 2022. Iran has since decreased compliance with its JCPOA nuclear commitments and barred some international inspectors in the context of heightened regional tensions. The U.S. intelligence community continues to assess that Iran is not currently undertaking nuclear weapons-related activities, but that Iran could enrich enough uranium for three nuclear devices within weeks if it chose to do so.

Iran’s Foreign Policy. In addition to its support for allied groups throughout the Middle East, Iran maintains what U.S. officials describe as “the largest inventory of ballistic missiles in the region” and has developed a range of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). These activities give Iran considerable regional influence, which the Iranian government has sought to reinforce by taking steps to strengthen its economic and military ties with Russia and China—for example, by exporting UAVs to bolster Russian military operations in Ukraine and selling oil to China. Iran has also sought to restore and strengthen ties with Middle Eastern states, including some U.S. partners.

The U.S. government has used various tools, including comprehensive sanctions, limited military action, and diplomatic engagement with leaders in Iran and other countries to counter what the U.S. officials describe as Iranian threats to U.S. interests. The Iranian government faces some challenges at home but retains considerable influence in the Middle East region, is developing new ties to Russia and China, and remains able to contest U.S. interests in the region and beyond. In this context, Members of Congress may consider U.S. and Iranian policy goals, the stability of Iran’s government, and efforts to counter Iran’s regional influence and deter its nuclear development activities.

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